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I. INTRODUCTION
The Caribbean islands of Cuba and Haiti are well-known for their po-
litically-tumultuous history and their abject poverty.' The citizenship of both
countries has suffered an inordinate amount of deprivation of the most ele-
mentary rights that humans possess.2 Their only outlet to reach the freedom
they both desire has been the high seas-the dangerous and treacherous wa-
* J.D. Candidate 2004, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center;
B.A., St. Thomas University. The author dedicates this Note in loving memory of his father,
Manuel A. Pdrez, who passed away on March 1, 2002. He would like to thank his family,
especially his mother Carmina P. Pdrez, for her unconditional love and support, his wife Tracy
Pdrez, for her inspiration in all endeavors, his father-in-law Lomberto Prez for his time and
contribution to this Note, Maria Vernace, Harris Nizel, Sarah Yoho, Julie Feder, and all of the
NOVA LAW REVIEW Staff for their exceptional work and dedication in striving to publish edu-
cational and informative articles.
1. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2003, available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cu.html [hereinafter CIA 1]; CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2003, available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ha.html [hereinafter CIA 1I].
2. Id.
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ters of the Atlantic that separate them from the beacon of freedom: Amer-
ica.3 Yet, Cuba is the only one that has an agreement with the United States
regarding the rights of its citizens to ask for political asylum.4 The Haitians
have no such agreement and have become disillusioned with what they per-
ceive is a double standard on the part of the United Statesf Why is this, and
do the Haitians have a legal basis to achieve parity with the Cubans? This
paper will discuss this very complex issue.
Part II of this article will discuss the history and reasons for Cuba's
many waves of immigration, as well as the policies instituted in the United
States with regard to such emigration. Part III of this article will discuss the
history and reasons for Haitian emigration and the laws and policies prohibit-
ing the same. Part IV will briefly explain the current controversy between
Cuban and Haitian emigration. Part V will analyze the scrutiny that is ap-
plied to laws relating to immigration policies, as well as the power of Con-
gress to regulate immigration. Part VI will analyze whether the policy is
unconstitutional on the basis that it discriminates against Haitians by specifi-
cally granting Cubans certain rights. Part VII will conclude with what can be
done to provide Haitians with similar rights.
II. CUBA AND EMIGRATION
Cuba's relationship with the United States was established well before
Fidel Castro's brutal reign over the now communist island.6 On May 20,
1902, the United States recognized Cuba's independence after Spain's sover-
eignty was renounced.7 A year later, the infamous Guantanamo Bay naval
base was acquired by the United States.8 Not surprisingly, the relationship
between the United States and Cuba in the preceding fifty-seven years was
stable and inconspicuous. 9 However, such relations would not last long. On
December 2, 1956, Fidel Castro and his close friend, "Che" Guevara infil-
3. Id.
4. Read Sawczyn, Note, The United States Immigration Policy Toward Cuba Violates
Established Maritime Policy, it Does not Curtail Illegal Immigration, and thus Should be
Changed so that Cuban Immigrants Are Treated Similarly to Other Immigrants, 13 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 343, 348 (2001).
5. See generally Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396 (D.C. 1985)
[hereinafter Gracey 1].
6. Maria E. Sartori, The Cuban Migration Dilemma: An Examination of the United
States' Policy of Temporary Protection in Offshore Safe Havens, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 319,
326(2001).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 326-27.
9. Id. at 327.
[Vol. 28:2:437
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trated the island of Cuba.' ° A little over two years later, Fidel Castro victori-
ously ousted then Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista."
In a speech dated January 3, 1959 to the people of Santiago de Cuba, Cas-
tro proclaimed:
I should add that, personally, I am not interested in power nor do I envis-
age assuming it at any time. All that I will do is to make sure that the sac-
rifices of so many compatriots should not be in vain, whatever the future
may hold in store for me.
In all my dealings, I have always acted loyally and frankly. One should
never consider what has been obtained underhandedly and with duplicity
as a triumph and the language of honor which you have heard from my
lips is the only language I know.
All I can do is ask you to give us time and to allow time to the civil pow-
ers of the Republic, so that we can do things the way the people want
them; but they must be done gradually, little by little .... The Revolution
cannot be completed in a single day but you may be sure that we will
carry the Revolution through to the full. You may be sure that for the first
time the Republic will be truly and entirely free and the people will have
their just recompense. Power was not achieved through politics, but
through the sacrifices of hundreds and thousands of our fellows. It is not a
promise we make to ourselves but to the people, the whole Cuban nation;
the man who has taken over power has no commitments with anyone
other than with the people.
True order is that based on freedom, on respect and on justice, but at the
same time that which precludes the use of force. Henceforward, the peo-
ple shall be entirely free and the people know how to conduct themselves,
as they have proven today. We have achieved the peace that our country
needs.
In the future, the armed forces of the Republic will be regarded as exem-
plary, given their ability, their training and the manner in which they iden-
tified with the cause of the people and because, henceforward, their rifles
will be solely and always at the service of the people .... The officers
will have authority; there will be discipline in the Army; there will be a
10. Roland Estevez, Note, Modern Application of the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 and
Helms-Burton: Adding Insult to Injury, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1273, 1273 (2002).
11. Id. at 1274.
2004]
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military penal code, in which any violation of human rights, any dishonor-
able or immoral acts by any military personnel, will be severely punished.
There will be no privileges; there will be no privileges for anyone; and the
members of the Armed Forces who are capable and deserving will be
promoted. It will not be as it has been in the past--that is, that relations
and friends are promoted, regardless of grades. This sort of thing will fin-
ish for the military as it will finish for laborers.
At last the people have been able to free themselves from this rabble.
Now anyone may speak out, whether they are for or against .... That
was not the case here previously because until the present time, they were
the only ones [allowed] to speak out; only they spoke out. And they spoke
against us. There will be freedom for those who speak in our favor and
for those who speak against us and criticize us. There will be freedom for
all men because we have achieved freedom for all men. We shall never
feel offended; we shall always defend ourselves and we shall follow a sin-
gle precept, that of respect for the rights and feelings of others.
On this date, today, when Dr. Urrutia took over the Presidency of the Re-
public Dr. Urrutia, the leader who declared that this was a just revolution--
on territory that has been liberated, which by now is the whole of our
country, I declare that I will assume only those duties assigned to me, by
him. The full authority of the Republic is vested in him. And our arms
bow respectfully to the civil powers of the Civilian Republic of Cuba ....
I surrender my authority to the Provisional President of the Republic of
Cuba and with it I surrender to him the right to address the people of
Cuba. 12
The term "provisional" referring to Dr. Urrutia's presidency was cor-
rect.' 3 Just seven months later, Dr. Urrutia resigned as President of the Re-
public of Cuba because of irreconcilable differences between him and then
prime minister, Fidel Castro. 14 Dr. Urrutia's resignation came right after a
televised speech given by Fidel Castro, accusing Dr. Urrutia of treason and
other high crimes. 5 Not surprisingly, Dr. Urrutia found it necessary to re-
sign from his post after Fidel Castro's own resignation as Prime Minister
during a televised speech. 6
12. Fidel Castro, Speaks to Citizens of Santiago (Jan. 3, 1959), available at
http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro/1959/19590103.
13. Robert E. Quirk, The Political End of "President" Urrutia, Free Cuba Foundation
(1993), at http://www.fiu.edu/-fcf/castroyearl/urrutia.dorticos.html.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
[Vol. 28:2:437
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After Dr. Urrutia's resignation, Fidel Castro appointed Osvaldo Dorti-
cos Torrado as the nineteenth president of the Republic of Cuba and, on July
26, 1959, the newly appointed president announced to the citizens of Cuba
that Fidel Castro was to return as premiership of the republic. 7 Shortly
thereafter, Fidel Castro's true vision of Cuba began to take form; instantane-
ously, he began to implement new changes within the political structure of
Cuba. 8 Cuba's wealthy were the first to feel Fidel Castro's wrath, thus
marking the beginning of a new sense of urgency to emigrate out of the
emerging communistic state.' 9 This growing concern continued and an esti-
mated 215,000 refugees fled the island of Cuba from 1959 to 1962.20
Rumors that the Cuban government intended to "nationalize" children
over the age of five began to circulate over the island.2' Frantic parents be-
gan to take desperate measures to ensure that their children would not be sent
to the Soviet Union for communistic indoctrination.22 Word of an under-
ground movement organized by the Catholic Church and the CIA operation,
code-named "Operation Pedro Pan," spread through the island.23  History
reveals that "Operation Pedro Pan" successfully extracted 14,048 Cuban
children, escalating the already growing immigration influx crisis of that
period.24 Thousands of these children left Cuba, not knowing whether they
would ever see their parents again.25 Unfortunately, for many that was the
17. Fidel Castro, Castro Agress [sic] to Return to Premiership (July 26, 1959), available
at http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro/1959/19590727.
18. Estevez, supra note 10, at 1274.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Yvonne A. Tamayo, Cubans Without Borders: Finding Home, 55 FLA. L. REV. 215,
221 (2003); Karen Fletcher, Cuba: U.S. Employs Weapons of Mass Migration, CISLAC, (May
2003), at http://www.cislac.org.au/n3.htm.
22. Tamayo, supra note 21.
23. Fletcher, supra note 21.
24. Tamayo, supra note 21.
25. Interview with Lomberto L. Prez, Operation Pedro Pan Participant, in Miami, Fla.
(July 2, 2003). Interviewee explained:
A year before I left Cuba I was in hiding. My mother and father feared the rumors that were
circulating over the Island. I thought to myself: "This could not be happening, the Govern-
ment was going to take all the children of Cuba to the Soviet Union! Why?" The time came
when the fear was too great, and my parents decided to send me to the United States by "Op-
eration Pedro Pan." This was an operation orchestrated by the Catholic Church and the CIA.
They were able to falsify our visas so that the Cuban government would think they were real. I
believe an estimated 14,000 children in 1962 reached United States soil because of Operation
Pedro Pan.
I still remember that day, May 1, 1962, when the authorities in Cuba stuck my brother and I in
a bathroom. There, a government agent began to touch us with his rough and cold hands. "Ba-
jense los Pantalones! (Lower your pants)," he said in a heartless and shaky voice. They found
nothing on either of us, except a sparkling silver, well taken care of Parker pen that my father
had recently given me. He found my stunning pen to his liking, so he decided he would make
5
Perez: Wet Foot, Dry Foot, No Foot: The Recurring Controversy Between Cu
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
NOVA LAW REVIEW
case.26  However, for others, a second influx of immigrants during 1962
through 1965 marked the beginning of a new life in a foreign land with their
reunited families.27
An estimated 74,000 Cuban nationals emigrated during the 1962 to
1965 period. Most were middle class immigrants who had the means and
connections within the United States to successfully emigrate from the is-
land.28 The number of immigrants during this period dramatically decreased
due to the horrific event that emerged at the time, an event that may as well
be classified as one, if not the most, terrifying event in American history.29
After a group of CIA-trained Cuban exiles failed to overthrow Castro's re-
gime in a covert operation better known as the "Bay of Pigs," the Soviet Un-
ion began to supply the Cuban government with much needed military artil-
lery.30 After sparking the United States' interest, surveillance revealed So-
viet-made nuclear missiles strategically placed on the communist island.3'
Obviously, the Kennedy administration took this as an immediate threat to
national security and suspended all flights to and from Cuba.32 Tensions
rapidly escalated and the world stood in amazement, as a nuclear confronta-
tion between the United States and the Soviet Union seemed imminent. 3
Fortunately, the confrontation between the nuclear powers was resolved ami-
cably, but the administration was still faced with Cuba and its emigration
problem.34
Flight restrictions to and from Cuba continued-a decision that Castro
was not very pleased about, given his utilization of such flights to rid the
it his. It was my pen, but what could I do? It was then 11:30 a.m. We were to board the plane
soon. All I could think about was that this trip would be temporary; I was to return to my
country once Fidel Castro's regime was overthrown.
It has been forty-one years since that day, and I have yet to return to my country. But, I am
grateful for the sacrifices my parents had to endure. Thankfully my parents were able to es-
cape from Castro's regime a couple of years later. Both were to die in the States without ever
returning to their home land. I have made the United States my home now, and I am grateful
for the opportunities this country has given me, the freedom to speak my mind, the freedom to
grow economically, but most of all the freedom to grow as an individual. I believe that all ex-
iles still dream of one day returning to their country, and once again walk through the streets
they once walked as children, as "Cubans."
Id.
26. Id.
27. Estevez, supra note 10, at 1274.
28. Id.
29. See Note, The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966: iMirando por los Ojos de Don Qui-
jote o Sancho Panza?, 114 HARV. L. REV. 902, 903 (2001) [hereinafter Don Quijote].
30. Id.
31. Id. at 904.
32. Id.
33. ld.
34. Don Quijote, supra note 29, at 904.
[Vol. 28:2:437
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island of individuals who he believed were anti-revolutionist. 5  In retalia-
tion, and as a response to unfounded propaganda by the imperialist, Castro,
in a speech dated September 28, 1965, announced that any Cuban national
having relatives in the United States were free to be picked up by sea vessel
from Cuba's shores without penalty or consequence.36
Such a decision by Castro aggravated the already growing immigration
influx problem which almost doubled in size, causing the United States to
lose control over the situation, forcing negotiations between Cuba and the
Johnson administration.37 An agreement between both governments was
reached and a more organized procedure was instituted.38 This enabled the
United States to have more control over Cuban emigrants who were Miami-
bound.39 The agreement called for the transportation of emigrants by flights,
which were later referred to as "freedom flights."4° An estimated 340,000
Cuban immigrants reached United States soil by way of "freedom flights."'
The United States Immigration Department was able to handle such an ex-
traordinary influx of Cuban immigrants with ease, due to Congress' enact-
ment of the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 ("CAA").42  The CAA enabled
Cuban immigrants to declare political asylum without having to prove refu-
35. Id.
36. Id.; see generally Fidel Castro, Speech at Ceremonies Marking Fifth Anniversary of
the CDR (Sept. 29, 1965), available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/
castro/1965/19650929. Fidel Castro, in his speech, proclaimed:
[T]he imperialists are making a campaign with those who go, when it is they who close all the
ways.
We have mediated about this. Illegal departures are not permitted. Among other things, what
is gained? The risks that are taken to join a family or simply because they do not like it here
and want to go? .... [W]e have no reason to force-absolutely anyone to like our revolution,
to like socialism, to like our ideals and communist society. We have, enough people who fight
for it and are ready to give their lives for it.
That is why we have never given reason for what they have done for almost three years, mak-
ing propaganda, fraudulent and dirty, with these cases. It is said that we machinegun those that
want to go and that we do horrible things against them. Well, we must put an end to this once
and for all. How? Well, we think that there is a good method. It is not we who are opposed to
the departure of those who want to go, but the imperialists, and since this is the fact, we are
even ready to fix up a little place somewhere so that all who have relatives here will not have
to run any risks, will not have to expose their relatives to any kind of risk.
We could for example, fix up the port of Camarioca in Matanzas, one of the closest points, so
that to all who have relatives we could give a permit to come by ship, regardless of who they
are, with all guarantees, giving advance notice in time, by correspondence, and if they cannot,
let them then address the correspondence to the Ministry ....
Id.
37. Don Quiote, supra note 29, at 904.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 905.
40. Id.
41. Estevez, supra note 10, at 1274.
42. See Sawczyn, supra note 4, at 346.
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gee status, thus allowing them to easily obtain residence in the United
States.43 The act reads as follows:
That, notwithstanding the provisions of section 245(c) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, the status of any alien who is a native or citizen of
Cuba and who has been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United
States subsequent to January 1, 1959 and has been physically present in
the United States for at least two years, may be adjusted by the Attorney
General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe,
to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if the alien
makes an application for such adjustment, and the alien is eligible to re-
ceive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for perma-
nent residence. Upon approval of such an application for adjustment of
status, the Attorney General shall create a record of the alien's admission
for permanent residence as of a date thirty months prior to the filing of
such an application or the date of his last arrival into the United States,
whichever date is later.
44
Congress enacted the CAA with four major reasons in mind: 1) to en-
sure national security; 2) to provide a safe haven for victims of persecution;
3) to reduce administrative burdens; and 4) to channel migrating Cubans into
the American workforce.45  However, the two underlying reasons for the
CAA, were the underlying spread of communism across the neighboring
Latin American countries and the destabilization of the Cuban island. 46 The
Soviets' efforts to utilize Cuba as a tool to spread communism across the
Latin American countries were evident.47  It was no surprise that Cuba's
revolution was highly viewed throughout the Latin American arena.41 Con-
cerns that the United States' Cold War influence was weakening within those
countries and around the world rapidly escalated.49  However, the United
States, by way of immigration law, sent out a loud and clear message to
communists across the world.5" Thousands of Cuban immigrants entered the
United States and sought safe haven in a democratic government, such de-
nouncement of government was viewed as powerful anti-communist propa-
43. Id. at 346-47.
44. Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, § 1, 80 Stat. 1161, 1161 (1966).
45. Don Quiote, supra note 29, at 908.
46. See id.
47. Estevez, supra note 10, at 1279; see also Joyce A. Hughes, Flight from Cuba, 36
CAL. W.L. REV. 39, 45 (1999).
48. Estevez, supra note 10, at 1279-80.
49. Don Quyote, supra note 29, at 908 (citing FELIX ROBERTO MASUD-PILOTO, WITH
OPEN ARMS: CUBAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 65, 129 (1988)).
50. Id. at 909; see also If Castro Is Counting on a Deal with Kennedy, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Jan. 16, 1961, at 38.
[Vol. 28:2:437
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ganda, which encouraged many concerned anti-communists.5' Furthermore,
the CAA, also served as an effective tool that exhausted Cuba of its physi-
cians, teachers, and technicians, a vital part of the population needed to carry
out Castro's communistic views.1
2
As a result of the mass professional exodus, in 1973, Castro found it
necessary to terminate all flights from Cuba to the United States in the hopes
that it would re-stabilize its social structure.5 3 Predictably, once the Cuban
dictator terminated all flights from Cuba, a sharp decrease in immigration
occurred, and many illegal escapes ensued.54 Many of these illegal escapes
continued until the 1980s." In an effort to burden the United States, Castro
opened the Cuban port of El Mariel, emptied his prisons, and allowed over
125,000 Cuban nationals to flood the shore lines of the United States. 6 In
response, the Carter administration welcomed the immigration influx with its
"open hearts and open arms" policy, allowing immigrants who sought refuge
from political persecution to seek asylum in the United States. 7 Fourteen
years later, Castro attempted to repeat history by allowing any Cuban na-
tional to leave the communist island.58 However, Cubans were not received
with "open hearts and open arms" by the Clinton administration. President
Clinton responded to Castro's attempt by enacting a new policy now known
as the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot Policy.59 This new policy called for the intercep-
tion and repatriation of Cuban immigrants at sea.6" However, because the
CAA was still in effect, those who reached United States soil were allowed
to stay, hence the name Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot Policy.
61
51. Estevez, supra note 10, at 1280.
52. Sawczyn, supra note 4, at 347; see MASUD-PILOTO, supra note 49, at 1.
53. Estevez, supra note 10, at 1274; see ALEJANDRO PORTES & ROBERT L. BACH, LATIN
JOURNEY: CUBAN AND MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 85 (1985).
54. Estevez, supra note 10, at 1274.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1275.
57. Id.; Yvette M. Mastin, Sentenced to Purgatory: The Indefinite Detention of Mariel
Cubans, 2 SCHOLAR 137, 142-43 (2000).
58. Estevez, supra note 10, at 1275; see Maria E. Sartori, The Cuban Migration Di-
lemma: An Examination of the United States' Policy of Temporary Protection in Offshore
Safe Havens, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 319, 328 (2001).
59. Sawczyn, supra note 4; NAT'L SEC. & INT'L AFFAIRS Div., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, PUB. L. No. 95-211, CUBA: U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994 CUBAN MIGRATION CRISIS 4
(1995), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/ns95211 .pdf.
60. Sawczyn, supra note 4; 140 CONG. REC. H8601-04 (1994); Tim Padgett, War Over a
Poster Boy, TIME, Dec. 13, 1999, at 68.
61. Sawczyn, supra note 4.
2004]
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III. HAITIAN EMIGRATION
A. The Foundation of Haitian Emigration
It has been stated that "[t]he United States' ongoing involvement in
Haitian affairs has contributed to the current economic and political crisis in
Haiti."62  These sentiments stem from long-standing Haitian immigration
policies.63 During the Kennedy administration, Haiti suffered the repressive
rule of Duvalier, also known as "Papa Doc," who engaged in ongoing human
rights violations. 64 Yet, the United States "turned a blind eye" and received
anti-Cuban support in return.65 In 1963, the United States officially severed
relations with Haiti. 66 However, the United States provided Haiti with mili-
tary support for some years thereafter. 67 Duvalier continued his oppressive
reign over Haiti until 1971 .68 In 1971, his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier, nick-
named "Baby Doc" took over the presidency.69 His reign was just as oppres-
sive as his father's previous reign.70 Baby Doc's reign lasted fifteen years,
until he was ousted in 1986.'
Due to the extraordinary amount of deaths continually occurring in
Haiti, the United States joined many other countries in demand of Baby
Doc's departure from Haiti.7 ' After his departure, the United States provided
Haiti with economic aide in the amount of $200 million. 3 During the years
that followed, specifically 1986 through 1990, Haiti encountered five differ-
ent presidents: 1) Leslie Manigat, elected by popular vote; 2) Henri Nam-
phy, came to power through a military coup; 3) Prosper Avril, came to power
62. Malissia Lennox, Note, Refugees, Racism, and Repatriations: A Critique of the
United States'Haitian Immigration Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 687, 692 (Feb. 1993).
63. See generally id.
64. Id. at 697; GILBURT LOESCHER & JOHN SCANLAN, HUMAN RIGHTS POWER POLITICS,
AND THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE REGIME: THE CASE OF U.S. TREATMENT OF CARIBBEAN
BASIN REFUGEES 12 (1985).
65. Lennox, supra note 62, at 697.
66. Id. (citing ROBERT 1. ROTBERG, HAITI: THE POLITICS OF SQUALOR 238 (1971)).
67. Lennox, supra note 62, at 697. "The assistance severely crippled Haiti because Papa
Doc promptly diverted funds to the Tonton Macoutes in order to maintain his stronghold.
Without the Macoutes, Papa Doc would have been powerless; and without U.S. military aid,
the militia would not have been so powerful." Id.
68. Id. (citing JAMES FERGUSON, PAPA Doc, BABY DOc: HAITI AND THE DUVALIERS 49
(1987)).
69. Lennox, supra note 62, at 697.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 697-98.
72. Id. at 698.
73. Id. (citing SIMON M. FASS, POLITICAL ECONOMY IN HAITI: THE DREAM OF SURVIVAL
15(1988)).
[Vol. 28:2:437
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through a military coup; 4) General Herard Abraham, appointed by Prosper
Avril; and 5) Ertha Pascal Trouillot, appointed by General Herard Abra-
ham.74 Clearly, there was no stability in Haiti.75
On February 7, 1991, Haiti's first democratic president was elected.76
Out of fourteen candidates running for president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a
Roman Catholic priest, succeeded in obtaining sixty-seven percent of the
country's votes.17 Aristide instilled democratic beliefs in the people of Haiti
by giving them hopes of a fair government.7 1 "He spoke for the impover-
ished majority and instilled hope that the corrupt politics of the elite govern-
ing class and vicious militia had come to an end. He immediately called for
the resignation of several key military leaders and began to investigate and
punish the criminal acts of his predecessors. 79 On September 30, 1991,
Haiti's quick encounter with democracy came to an abrupt end.8" "[T]he
Tonton Macoutes ousted Aristide from power, throwing Haiti in to a spiral of
political violence so brutal as to give rise to the recent refugee crisis."
81
In Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Gracey,82 the Haitian Refugee Center
alleged that the United States' program of high seas interdiction violates Hai-
tians' rights under the Refugee Act of 1980 and the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act.83 The Haitian Refugee Center further alleged that the United States
had violated the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution by depriving refugees
on interdicted vessels from Haiti the rights and liberties they were entitled to
through the Refugee Act and Immigration and Nationality Act. 4 They also
alleged "that the interdiction program fail[ed] to satisfy the 'nonrefoulment
obligation' imposed by the United Nations Protocol and Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights by creating a substantial risk that political refugees
[would] be forcibly returned to face persecution.85 It was further alleged
that the interdiction program violated Article Three of the United Nations
Convention, relating to the section of racial and other discrimination.86
74. Lennox, supra note 62, at 698.
75. Id. (citing HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON HAITIAN REFUGEE
PROTECTION ACT OF 1992, H. R. REP. No. 437, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1992)).
76. Lennox, supra note 62, at 698.
77. Id.; I EUROPA PUBLICATIONS, THE EUROPA WORLDBOOK 1992, 1304 (33d ed. 1992).
78. Lennox, supra note 62, at 698.
79. Id. (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 698-99.
81. Id.
82. 600 F. Supp. 1396 (D.C. 1985).
83. Id. at 1401.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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Lastly, the Haitian Refigee Center alleged that the interdiction program vio-
lated the extradition statute87 and the Extradition Treaty between Haiti and
the United States.88
After taking these allegations into consideration, the court held:
Although the plaintiffs have standing to bring this suit, none of the four
Counts contained in the instant complaint states a cause of action upon
which this Court may grant relief. Because the interdiction program
herein attacked occurs outside the jurisdiction of the United States, neither
the statutes nor the treaty upon which plaintiffs rely can provide any relief.
Because the interdicted Haitians never reach the shores of the United
States, they are entitled to no protections contained within the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution. The plaintiffs also can find no relief in
the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
89
In Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker,90 the district court granted pre-
liminary injunctions which forbade James Baker, III, the Secretary of State
and others, from repatriating Haitians that were in their custody.91 On ap-
peal, Baker argued that the Haitian plaintiffs did not have any "enforceable
rights under Article 33 because Article 33 is not self-executing as to persons
87. Specifically referring to 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (2000), which states in part:
(a) The provisions of this chapter relating to the surrender of persons who have committed
crimes in foreign countries shall continue in force only during the existence of any treaty of ex-
tradition with such foreign government.
(b) The provisions of this chapter shall be construed to permit, in the exercise of comity, the
surrender of persons, other than citizens, nationals, or permanent residents of the United States,
who have committed crimes of violence against nationals of the United States in foreign coun-
tries without regard to the existence of any treaty of extradition with such foreign government
if the Attorney General certifies, in writing, that-
(1) evidence has been presented by the foreign government that indicates that had the offenses
been committed in the United States, they would constitute crimes of violence as defined under
section 16 of this title; and
(2) the offenses charged are not of a political nature.
Id.
88. Gracey1, 600 F. Supp. at 1401.
89. Id. at 1406-07. The court further held:
It is clear that the President instituted the interdiction program pursuant to ample constitutional
and statutory authority. This program is carried out pursuant to an agreement with Haiti, and is
therefore intricately interwoven with matters of foreign relations. Because such programs "'are
so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government", this Court's review is corre-
spondingly narrow .... Although the actions of the plaintiffs, and their representatives, are
commendable, and stem from the highest form of humanitarian concern, the Court cannot al-
low its sympathy for the plight of the Haitians to blind it from the law. The Court simply can
find no basis for relief. The Court has today issued an Order, consistent with this Opinion,
which dismisses this action for the reasons herein stated.
Id. at 1407.
90. 949 F.2d 1109 (1lth Cir. 1991).
91. Id. at 1110.
12
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 16
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss2/16
WETFOOT, DRYFOOT NO FOOT
situated like the plaintiffs in this case," since the Haitian plaintiffs have not
reached United States territory.92 Further, Baker argued that the injunction
issued by the district court was unrelated to the rights claimed by the Haitian
Refugee Center.93  Due to the arguments asserted by Baker, the Eleventh
Circuit dissolved the injunction issued by the district court and remanded the
case with instructions to dismiss the case.94 Although once again Haitians
were refused entry into the United States, it is important to note that Judge
Hatchett dissented and recognized that Haitians are the only refugees that are
intercepted in the waters and returned to their country.95 The Haitian Refu-
gee Center appealed to the United States Supreme Court for an application of
stay and petitioned for writ of certiorari. 96 The Court denied the writ for cer-
tiorari.97
Following Baker, the Supreme Court decided the case of Sale v. Haitian
Centers Council, Inc.98 The issue in Sale was "whether... forced repatria-
tion, 'authorized to be undertaken only beyond the territorial sea of the
United States,' violate[d] § 243(h)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952." 99 The Haitian respondents in this case included both interdicted
Haitians as well as detained Haitians.'00 They sued on the basis that the Hai-
tians' rights were not sufficiently protected under their statutory and treaty
rights "to apply for refugee status and [prevent] repatriation to Haiti."'0 ' The
Court found that there was no judicial remedy for the Haitians, agreeing with
92. Id.
93. Id. at I111.
94. Id.
95. Baker, 949 F.2d at 1110. Judge Hatchett stated as factual matters the following:
I. Under existing law, any refugee may reach the shores of the United States and thereby ac-
quire the right to enforce United States immigration laws in United States courts, except Hai-
tian refugees.
Only Haitian refugees are intercepted in international waters and repatriated to their country of
origin. This activity is conducted under an agreement between the Reagan administration and
the totalitarian Haitian government in place in 1981, the regime of Jean-Claude Duvalier.
4. The government seeks to convince this court that its interdiction program was instituted as
an effort to save the lives of Haitian refugees traveling in unseaworthy vessels. But the gov-
ernment's own brief shows that the program was instituted in 1981, long before the current
immigration wave, for the express purpose of more efficiently enforcing United States immi-
gration law. The primary purpose of the program was, and has continued to be, to keep Hai-
tians out of the United States.
Id. at 1111-12 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
96. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 502 U.S. 1122 (1992).
97. Id.
98. 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
99. Id. at 158.
100. Id. at 166.
101. Id.
2004]
13
Perez: Wet Foot, Dry Foot, No Foot: The Recurring Controversy Between Cu
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
NOVA LA WREVIEW
Judge Edwards' concurring opinion in Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v.
Gracey, which stated, "[t]his case presents a painfully common situation in
which desperate people, convinced that they can no longer remain in their
homeland, take desperate measures to escape."'' 1 2 The Court further stated
that "[a]lthough the human crisis is compelling, there is no solution to be
found in a judicial remedy."'10 3
B. Laws Relating to Haitian Emigration
On March 17, 1980, the ninety-sixth Congress enacted a public law to
amend the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Migration and Refugee
Assistance Act of 1962.' 0 The purpose of this was to establish a more uni-
form procedure for admitting and assisting refugees. 5 The Act was titled
Refugee Act of 1980.116 The public law added a paragraph defining refugee
as follows:
(42) The term 'refugee' means (A) any person who is outside any
country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person hav-
ing no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last
habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and
is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection
of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion, or (B) in such
special circumstances as the President after appropriate consulta-
tion (as defined in section 207(e) of this Act) may specify, any per-
son who is within the country of such person's nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, within the country in which
such person is habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who
has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. The term 'refugee' does not include any person who
ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecu-
102. Id. at 188 (citing Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 841 (D.C. Cir.
1987) [hereinafter Gracey 11]).
103. Sale, 509 U.S. at 188 (citing Gracey 1, 809 F.2d at 841).
104. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1980)).
105. Id.
106. Id.
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tion of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion.1 °7
On September 23, 1981, the United States and Haiti authorized the
Coast Guard to intercept vessels with illegal undocumented aliens. 10 8 In re-
turn, the Haitian government agreed that it would not punish those who were
returned in this interception process, and that those who qualified as refugees
would not be returned to Haiti.'0 9 Following the United States-Haiti Agree-
ment, President Reagan issued a presidential proclamation on September 29,
1981. '0 He opened the proclamation by stating, "[t]he ongoing migration of
persons to the United States in violation of our laws is a serious national
problem detrimental to the interests of the United States.""' President
Reagan, stated in the September 29, 1981 presidential proclamation, that
"[t]he entry of undocumented aliens from the high seas is hereby suspended
and shall be prevented by the interdiction of certain vessels carrying such
aliens."' 12  Following this proclamation, about 25,000 Haitian emigrants
were interdicted by the Coast Guard in the 1980s." 3 Many emigrants were
107. Id.
108. Sale, 509 U.S. at 160.
109. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 160 (1993). The actual agreement
between the United States and Haiti stated the following:
The Government of Haiti agrees to permit upon prior notification the return of detained vessels
and persons to a Haitian port, or if circumstances permit, the United States Government will
release such vessels and migrants on the high seas to representatives of the Government of the
Republic of Haiti.
The Government of the Republic of Haiti agrees, to the extent permitted by Haitian law, to
prosecute illegal traffickers of Haitian migrants who do not have requisite permission to enter
the country of the vessel's destination and to confiscate Haitian vessels or stateless vessels in-
volved in such trafficking. The United States Government likewise agrees, to the extent per-
mitted by United States law, to prosecute traffickers of United States nationality and to confis-
cate United States vessels engaged in such trafficking.
The United States Government appreciates the assurances which it has received from the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Haiti that Haitians returned to their country and who are not traf-
fickers will not be subject to prosecution for illegal departure.
It is understood that under these arrangements the United States Government does not intend to
return to Haiti any Haitian migrants whom the United States authorities determine to qualify
for refugee status.
U.S. Treaty, Aug. 1, 1981, U.S.-Haiti, 33 U.S.T. 3559, T.I.A.S. No. 10,241, 1981 WL 377055.
110. Proclamation No. 4865, 3 C.F.R. 50 (1981), microformedon Code of Fed. Reg. (Wil-
liam S. Hein & Co., Inc.).
111. Id.
112. Id.at5l.
113. Sale, 509 U.S. at 161.
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"screened out" and repatriated, while some were "'screened in"' which led to
applications for asylum." 4
On May 23, 1992, President Bush issued Executive Order No. 12,807
which states:
(1) The President has authority to suspend the entry of aliens coming by
sea to the United States without necessary documentation, to establish rea-
sonable rules and regulations regarding, and other limitations on, the entry
or attempted entry of aliens into the United States, and to repatriate aliens
interdicted beyond the territorial sea of the United States;
(2) The international legal obligations of the United States under the
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to apply Arti-
cle 33 of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees do not extend to persons located outside the territory of the United
States;
(3) Proclamation No. 4865 suspends the entry of all undocumented aliens
into the United States by the high seas; and
(4) There continues to be a serious problem of persons attempting to
come to the United States by sea without necessary documentation and
otherwise illegally;
Sec. 2. (a) The Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is
operating, in consultation, where appropriate, with the Secretary of De-
fense, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of State, shall issue appro-
priate instructions to the Coast Guard in order to enforce the suspension of
the entry of undocumented aliens by sea and the interdiction of any de-
fined vessel carrying such aliens. "1
5
The reason for President Bush's Executive Order was the military coup
which took place in Haiti during September 199 L."' The emigrant facilities
became saturated with Haitians fleeing their country because of their politi-
cal beliefs." 7 As such, the United States Government was placed in a bind
because it "could no longer both protect [its] borders and offer the Haitians
even a modified screening process.""' 8 The United States was left with two
choices: allowing Haitians into the country for screening or repatriating Hai-
114. Id.
115. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23, 133 (May 24, 1992), microformed on Fed.
Reg. (William S. Hein & Co., Inc.) (citations omitted).
116. Sale, 509 U.S. at 162.
117. Id. at 162--63.
118. Id. at 163.
[Vol. 28:2:437
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tians without having an opportunity to establish refugee status."' President
Bush pursued the latter in an effort to assist in the restoration of democracy
in Haiti. 2° Additionally, President Bush believed this decision was made in
the interest of safety since so many Haitians were risking their lives in
treacherous conditions to pursue freedom in the United States. 2 ' As such,
Executive Order Number 12,807, which was previously discussed, was im-
plemented. 2 2 Once President Clinton took office he continued to enforce
this order originally implemented by President Bush.
2 3
The foregoing were the main presidential proclamations and executive
orders that were implemented as a migration policy. 24 Prior to the definition
of the term "refugee" in the Refugee Act of 1980, there was no definition of
a "refugee."'' 2 5 Today, the term as defined in the statute has incorporated the
following into the definition:
For purposes of determinations under this chapter, a person who has been
forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who
has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or
for other resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be
deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a
person who has a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to un-
dergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal,
or resistance shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution
on account of political opinion.1
2 6
It is in the discretion of the Attorney General to grant a refugee asy-
lum. 27 This discretion only comes after the refugee proves that he or she is a
refugee. 28 Many states, especially Florida, have a difficult task in protecting
and responding to refugees.
119. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 163 (1993).
120. See id. at 164.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 166.
123. Id. at 164-65.
124. Id.
125. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § I 101(a) (1980)).
126. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000).
127. Sale, 509 U.S. at 161.
128. Id.
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IV. THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY INVOLVING CUBAN AND HAITIAN
EMIGRATION
Currently, in Haiti, "about 80% of the population lives in abject pov-
erty."' 129 There is widespread unemployment, with about two-thirds of the
labor force working in non-formal jobs. 31
It is estimated that seventy percent of the population relies on the coun-
try's agriculture sector, which composes thirty percent of the country's work-
ing segment.' 31 Haiti's life expectancy is estimated at a ghastly forty-nine
years. 32
I saw grown men yoked to carts bulging with sacks of cement, their bod-
ies bent and their leathery faces aged prematurely from backbreaking
work. Naked prepubescent children, their chocolate skin draped over their
rib cages, skipped through puddles of raw sewage.
Bloated toddlers foraged through trash piles along with the pigs.
I didn't see bloated children in Cuba. I didn't see open sewers and people
who, on top of their abject poverty, being forced to buy something as es-
sential to their survival as drinking water. I know that as tough as things
may be for many Cubans, most of their babies won't die within a year.
Their infant mortality rate is seven dead per 1,000 births. In Haiti, it's 93
per 1,000.
Yet, the Haitian refugees are treated as villains, while the Cuban refugees
get treated as victims. 133
For many Haitian-Americans, the United States' preferential treatment
of Cuban immigrants has gone too far.' 34 As previously discussed, Cubans,
for the past forty years, have been afforded special privileges and favorable
immigration laws. 3 Moreover, for years they have enjoyed the spoils of the
129. CIA II, supra note 1.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Tonyaa Weathersbee, U.S. Immigration Policy on Haiti Must be Changed, FLA.
TIMES UNION (Jacksonville), Nov. 4, 2002, at B 1-3, available at 2002 WL 26120488.
134. See Andres Viglucci & Alfonso Chardy, Images from Causeway Renew Debate on
Migrants' Treatment, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 30, 2002, at A20, available at 2002 WL
101288874.
135. Berta E. Hemandez-Truyol, On Becoming the Other: Cubans, Castro, and Elian-A
LatCritical Analysis, 78 DENY. U. L. REV. 687,689 (2001).
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Cold War fervor.'36 Cubans, during that time, fled the communist island in
pursuit of happiness, leaving behind all their belongings, choosing freedom
of speech, freedom to vote, and freedom to travel over their material
wealth.'37 Moreover, Cuban emigrants were the depiction of democracy,
evidence to the world that capitalism was unmistakably superior to commu-
nism. 38 As a result of such elevation, Cuban immigrants who arrived during
the Cold War era enjoyed the benefits of special immigration laws such as
the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (CAA).'39 However, when the Soviet
Union fell, sentiments concerning the Cubans preferential treatment began to
change. 4° Consequently, in response to public outcry, immigration law for
the first time took an unfavorable turn for Cuban emigrants."' In May of
1995, the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot Policy was put into effect. 142 This policy, as
previously discussed, calls for the repatriation of Cuban emigrants who are
intercepted at sea; and those who are fortunate enough to make it to United
States soil become eligible for adjustment under the CAA.'43 Many Cuban-
Americans in the United States believe that the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot Policy
purposely prevents the intended role of the CAA, and the United States'
"principle that '[e]veryone has the right to seek and enjoy asylum if they are
forced to flee their country to escape persecution."' 144 Additionally, many
of the exiled population whose relatives are repatriated worry for their loved
ones' safety because they fear Fidel Castro's heartless regime will persecute
them. 4
Haitians, on the other hand, believe that the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot Policy
is discriminatory, racist, and plain unfair.'4 6 On October 29, 2002, over two
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 690.
139. See Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, § 1, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966).
140. Erin M. O'Callaghan, Note, Expedited Removal and Discrimination in the Asylum
Process: The Use of Humanitarian Aid as a Political Tool, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747,
1764 (2002).
141. Id.
142. Sartori, supra note 6, at 353.
143. Sawczyn, supra note 4, at 348.
144. O'Callaghan, supra note 140, at 1765 (quoting Amnesty International, Amnesty
International Testimony on INS Detention: Before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 8
(Dec. 8, 2000), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/refugee/testimony.pd; see also
Estevez, supra note 10, at 1290.
145. See Elaine De Valle, My Brother Was Not a Terrorist, Woman Says, MIAMI HERALD,
Apr. 12, 2003, at A1, available at 2003 WL 17410591.
146. See The Travis Smiley Show: Interview: Marlene Bastien Talks About the Plight of
Haitian Immigrants (National Public Radio, May 28, 2003), at 2003 WL 7629081 [hereinafter
Marlene Bastien Interview].
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hundred Haitian emigrants successfully reached American soil; many scram-
bled in desperation through bumper-to-bumper traffic on the Rickenbacker
Causeway in Miami, in an effort to elude authorities. 47 Unfortunately,
touching American soil for Haitians means nothing, unless they evade au-
thorities and seek refuge with family, friends, and/or human right organiza-
tions' 48 Haitians, who decide to take the antagonistic voyage through shark-
infested waters, leave their country well aware that, historically, emigrants
from Haiti have a difficult time gaining asylum. 49 From 1997 to 2002, im-
migration courts received 21,374 asylum applications from Haitians, and a
vile 1,284 have been approved.150 Jacques Despinosse, a North Miami City
Councilman who represents the city of Miami's Haitian-American commu-
nity stated in a recent newspaper article; .'[i]f you come here from a com-
munist country, it's OK. If you come from a white country, it's OK. If you
come here from a black country, noncommunist, it's not OK."" 5' However,
two weeks after the October twenty-ninth incident, the Bush administration,
in an attempt to alleviate rising tensions, announced "that all illegal immi-
grants who arrive by sea, except those who fall under the 1966 Cuban Ad-
justment Act, would be detained."'5 2 After hearing the Bush administration
announcement, Harold Vieux, President of the Conference of Haitian Pastors
United in Christ stated, "'[i]f they have one exception then it doesn't apply to
everyone... I'm not saying that the policy should be lenient, but I'm saying
that it should be fair."" 53 Marlene Bastien, Executive Director of the Haitian
Women of Miami Incorporated had this to say about United States immigra-
tion policies toward Cubans:
Haitians, when they come here, they come here also because of political
reasons, political problems, because it is a very young democracy. De-
mocracy takes time to grow, especially for a country that has been living
under dictatorships for almost 200 years. You can't expect things to
change in a couple of years. So, of course, there are political problems
there. 1
54
147. See Viglucci & Chardy, supra note 134.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. Sabra Ayres, Haitians Seek Same Treatment as Cubans, SUN-NEWS (Myrtle Beach,
S.C.), Nov. 17, 2002, at A15, available at 2002 WL 101837645.
152. Georgia East & Thomas Monnay, Haitian Activists Plan National Protest, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Nov. 10, 2002, at 2B, available at 2002 WL 102435011.
153. Id.
154. Marlene Bastien Interview, supra note 146.
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For years, Haitian-Americans have vocalized their frustrations toward
the treatment Haitians receive under United States immigration policies; they
have even gone as far as threatening to mount a legal challenge to the Wet-
Foot/Dry-Foot Policy.'55 "'I'd like them to eliminate this wet foot/dry foot
policy. It's unfair to immigrants."" 56
V. RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY AS APPLIED TO ALIEN REGULATIONS AND
THEIR CONSTITUTIONALITY
Paramount within our democratic values is the separation of powers
among the three co-equal branches of government. The law teaches us
that the power to control a nation's borders is so fundamental to its sover-
eignty that we must abide by the lawfully enacted policy decisions made
by the Legislative and Executive branches, or seek change at the ballot
box. In immigration matters, neither individuals nor the Court can substi-
tute their policy perspectives for the judgments made by Executive offi-
cials, based upon facially legitimate and bona fide reasons, pursuant to
statutory and delegated authority.1
57
155. BBC News Online, U.S. Immigration Policy Branded 'Racist,' Jan. 3, 2000, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/589848.stm.
156. Id. (quoting Marlene Bastien Interview, supra note 146).
157. Jeanty v. Bulger, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1383-84 (S.D. Fla. 2002). In Jeanty, 167
Haitian nationals brought an action for injunctive relief and declaratory relief expressing con-
fusions as to why they were detained in a facility while their asylum applications remained
pending. Id. at 1368. Since none of the aliens entered the country with proper documentation
under the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), they were considered legally inadmissi-
ble. Id. at 1369. One hundred and sixty-five of the 167 Haitian nationals passed their "credi-
ble fear" interviews with an Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) Asylum Officer.
Id. at 1369 n.3. Passing the credible fear interview allowed each Haitian national a "Notice to
Appear" form for non-expedited removal proceedings, the chance to apply for asylum, and
being released pending final adjudication of the asylum applications. Id. However, the INS
"reversed its general presumption of release for undocumented Haitians arriving in South
Florida." Jeanty, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1369. Only pregnant women and unaccompanied minors
were given authorization to be released. Id. From the date the court issued the decision, the
Haitian nationals had been in detention for over five months. Id. at 1368. The court reiterated
what many previous courts have held and stated the following:
[W]ith regard to aliens seeking initial admission to this country, the role of federal courts is
limited. The Supreme Court "has long held that an alien seeking initial admission to the
United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application for
the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative."
Id. at 1375 (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982)). In support of its decision
to deny the Haitian nationals injunctive and declaratory relief, the court continues to quote
previous decisions by the Eleventh Circuit and the United States Supreme Court. Id. As such,
the court stated that "[e]xcludable aliens are 'those who seek admission but who have not been
granted entry into the United States,"' so as to point at that "'[e]ven if [the Haitian nationals
are] physically present in this country, they are legally considered detained at the border'
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In Mathews v. Diaz, 5s the United States Supreme Court decided the
constitutionality of Congress passing laws that discriminate in favor of citi-
zens disparately from aliens.' The appellees in Mathews were Cuban refu-
gees who were over sixty-five years of age and were denied Medicare on the
basis that they had to be admitted for permanent residence and have to have
resided in the United States for a minimum of five years. 6 ' The appellees
were "two of over 440,000 Cuban refugees who arrived in the United States
between 1961 and 1972,"'16I however they did not meet the statutory re-
quirements to receive Medicare. 62 The Court commenced its analysis of the
statute's constitutionality by discussing that the Fifth Amendment and Four-
teenth Amendment safeguards all aliens within the jurisdiction of the United
States from "deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law.'
163
Despite an alien's entrance into the United States, the alien is still af-
forded constitutional protection, regardless of whether the alien entered the
United States illegally, legally, involuntary, or transitory."6 However, the
Court made a distinction between the extent of protection aliens are entitled
to as opposed to citizens. 165 "The fact that all persons, aliens and citizens
alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause does not lead to the further
conclusion that all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizen-
ship or. . . that all aliens must be placed in a single homogenous classifica-
tion.' 66 Invidious discrimination cannot be subsumed from a statutory treat-
ment distinguishing between aliens and citizens because Congress has the
expansive powers over naturalization and immigration, such that it "regularly
makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens."
67
[which] is known as the 'entry fiction."' Jeanty, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1375 (quoting Garcia-Mir
v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478, 1483-84 (11th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted)). Finally, the court
made a point to assert that "'[e]xcludable aliens have fewer rights than do deportable aliens,
and those seeking initial admission to this country have the fewest of all."' Id. (quoting
Landon, 459 U.S. at 32).
158. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
159. Id. at 74.
160. Id. at 70.
161. Id. at 81.
162. Id. at 67.
163. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77 (citing Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 48-51
(1950); Russian Fleet v. United States 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931); Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896)).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 78.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 80. The Court further stated the reason Congress has such expansive powers
over naturalization and immigration as the following:
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Determining that Congress has the power to make laws that disparately
treat aliens from citizens, the Court recognized that the actual issue in this
case was "whether statutory discrimination within the class of aliens-
allowing benefits to some aliens but not to others-is permissible."'168 It falls
upon the hands of the legislative branch, executive branch, and the federal
government to regulate matters regarding aliens.169  The Court asserted that
"[t]he reasons that preclude judicial review of political questions also dictate
a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the Presi-
dent in the area of immigration and naturalization."' 7 ° In deciding that Con-
gress indeed had the power to distinguish among aliens, the Court held:
Since it is obvious that Congress has no constitutional duty to provide all
aliens with the welfare benefits provided to citizens, the party challenging
the constitutionality of the particular line Congress has drawn has the bur-
den of advancing principled reasoning that will at once invalidate that line
and yet tolerate a different line separating some aliens from others .... In
short, it is unquestionably reasonable for Congress to make an alien's eli-
gibility depend on both the character and the duration of his residence.
Since neither requirement is wholly irrational, this case essentially in-
volves nothing more than a claim that it would have been more reasonable
for Congress to select somewhat different requirements of the same
kind.'
71
Based on the Court's holding in Mathews, subsequent cases have estab-
lished that rational basis scrutiny is the type of scrutiny applied when deter-
mining the constitutionality of regulations regarding aliens. 7 2 One of these
Since decisions in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers, and since a
wide variety of classifications must be defined in the light of changing political and economic
circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Leg-
islature or the Executive than to the Judiciary. This very case illustrates the need for flexibility
in policy choices rather than the rigidity often characteristic of a constitutional adjudica-
tion .... Any rule of constitutional law that would inhibit the flexibility of the political
branches government to respond to changing world conditions should be adopted only with the
greatest caution.
Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81.
168. Id. at 80.
169. Id. at 81. The Court quoted the following:
"[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous poli-
cies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a re-
publican form of government. Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political
branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference."
Id. at 81 n.17 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952)).
170. Id. at 81-82.
171. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 82-83 (emphasis added).
172. See, e.g., Moore v. Ashcroft, 251 F.3d 919 (11th Cir. 2001); Rodriguez ex rel. Rodri-
guez v. United States, 169 F.3d 1342 (1 lth Cir. 1999).
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cases is Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. United States.73 In Rodriguez, the
court determined the requirement that regulations involving aliens be
"wholly irrational" as held by the Court in Mathews, was another way of
describing rational basis scrutiny. 74  In ascertaining whether a regulation
satisfies rational basis scrutiny, the court set forth the following:
Under rational basis scrutiny, "a classification neither involving funda-
mental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong pre-
sumption of validity," and should be upheld "if there is a rational relation-
ship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental
purpose." The Supreme Court has cautioned that "rational-basis review in
equal protection analysis is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom,
fairness, or logic of legislative choices .... [A] classification must be
upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably con-
ceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classifica-
tion." 
1 75
The court concluded in Rodriguez that the statute in question making
supplemental security income benefits and food stamps available to only
certain categories of aliens, which reduced the number of aliens qualified for
the same, was rationally related to Congress' legitimate purpose of decreas-
ing the cost of certain welfare programs. 176  The court emphasized that
"[p]art and parcel of Congress' power to regulate immigration is the power
to control the effects of immigration." '77 Additionally, and most importantly
the court further stressed that, "[w]here Congress makes a judgment that
immigration is creating, or adding to, financial burdens, it lies within Con-
gress' plenary sovereign power over immigration to take action to alleviate
such burdens."'
178
A further decision deriving the rational basis standard from Mathews is
Moore v. Ashcroft. 79 In Moore, the court concluded, that "Congress' deci-
sion to prohibit lawful permanent resident aliens who commit aggravated
felonies from seeking discretionary relief... is ... []reasonable even though
173. 169 F.3d at 1342.
174. Id. at 1347. "The Court concluded, there is no 'political hypocrisy' in applying strict
scrutiny to a state's classification of aliens, but the considerably narrower 'wholly irrational'
or rational basis test to Congress' classification of aliens." Id. (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67, 86-87 (1976)).
175. Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1350 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993)
(citations omitted)).
176. Id. at 1350-51.
177. Id. at 1351.
178. Id.
179. 251 F.3d 919 (llth Cir. 2001).
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such relief is theoretically still available to illegal aliens."' 8 ° Although this
may initially appear to be an astonishing decision, the court averred that
Congress had substantial reasons for this regulation, such that those reasons
fell within Congress' "broad power to regulate the admission and exclusion
of aliens."'' In so deciding, the court asserted that one of the reasons ra-
tional basis existed for Congress' regulation was because it is appropriate to
hold permanent legal aliens "to a higher standard and level of responsibility
than illegal aliens" due to the substantial rights and privileges they are
granted through such status. 182 The court concluded that Moore failed to
assert a significant equal protection claim since a rational basis existed for
Congress' decision to regulate lawful permanent residents. 1
83
It has been made abundantly clear by the judicial branch that Congress
need only have a rational basis when formulating and adopting regulations
concerning aliens, even if such regulations discriminate among different
classes of aliens.8 4 As such, the following will analyze the constitutionality
of the Cuban Adjustment and the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot Policy, specifically
with regard to the distinguishing of certain classes of aliens, namely Cubans
and Haitians. The reason for such an analysis stems from the history of pro-
tection Cuban refugees have received throughout the years, while Haitian
refugees have historically been denied such protection. This has caused con-
tinuous controversy over the years.
VI. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE WET-FOOT/DRY-FOOT POLICY
In order to establish whether the Haitians may bring a cause of action
against the government alleging that the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot Policy is uncon-
stitutional, as it discriminates against them, it must be determined that the
Haitians have standing to bring such a cause of action. 85 The two elements
involved in the "standing doctrine" are "the minimum constitutional re-
180. Id. at 926. The court reasserted its observations of the Supreme Court's concern with
rational basis review. Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1351).
181. Id. at 924.
182. Id. at 925. The court alluded in a footnote to the Government's brief by stating:
As the Government points out in its brief, the opportunity that U.S. immigration law extends to
lawful permanent residents to enter and remain in this country is a privilege, not an entitle-
ment. Lawful permanent residents who abuse the privilege and commit crimes usurp immigra-
tion opportunities that might otherwise be extended to other potentially more deserving immi-
grants.
Moore, 251 F.3d at 925 n.9.
183. Id. at 926.
184. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); Moore, 251 F.3d at 919; Rodriguez
ex rel. Rodriguez v. United States, 169 F.3d 1342 (11 th Cir. 1999).
185. See Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n, Inc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1422 (11 th Cir. 1995).
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quirements of Article III, and the prudential considerations of judicial self-
government."' 186 The plaintiff must establish the following factors in order to
meet the Article III constitutional requirements: "(1) that he has suffered an
actual or threatened injury, (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the chal-
lenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that the injury is likely to be re-
dressed by a favorable ruling."'' 87 "The party must also show that prudential
considerations do not weigh against consideration of the claims."', 88
The Eleventh Circuit has held and reaffirmed that aliens who are "un-
admitted and excludable" are not entitled to the equal protection privilege
pursuant to the Fifth Amendment. 89 It is only when aliens are admitted into
the United States that constitutional rights form and commence.' 90 "[The]
decision that the . . . Haitian migrants have no First Amendment or Fifth
Amendment rights which they can assert is supported by the Supreme
Court's decisions declining to apply extraterritorially either the Fourth
Amendment or the Fifth Amendment."'' In Cuban American Bar Ass 'n,
Inc. v. Christopher, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "aliens who are out-
side the United States cannot claim rights to enter or be paroled into the
United States based on the Constitution."'' 92 As such, it is unrealistic for in-
tercepted Haitian refugees who are repatriated to challenge the constitution-
ality of the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot Policy, since they are considered "unadmitted
and excludable" aliens, and according to the courts are not afforded constitu-
tional protection until they are admitted into the United States. 93 Accord-
ingly, although intercepted Haitian refugees may have standing to bring such
a claim, several decisions have already ruled that they are not protected un-
der the Constitution. 1
94
However, it seems that family members of the intercepted and repatri-
ated Haitian refugees may have a cause of action and meet the factors neces-
sary to establish standing in such a cause of action."' Of course, the family
members must reside in the United States, otherwise the same hurdle in es-
tablishing equal protection rights would occur as with intercepted Haitian
186. Id. at 1423.
187. Id. (quoting Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 (1 Ith Cir. 1994)).
188. Christopher, 43 F.3d at 1423.
189. Id. at 1428 (describing its holding in Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 968-70 (1Ith Cir.
1984) (stating that the plaintiffs, "unadmitted and excludable aliens," have no constitutional
rights to challenge decisions regarding admission, asylum, or parole applications)).
190. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).
191. Christopher, 43 F.3d at 1428 (citations omitted).
192. Id. at 1428-29.
193. Id. at 1428.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1423;seealsoHarris, 20F.3dat 1121.
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refugees.'96 In establishing standing to challenge the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot
Policy as discriminatory against Haitians, the family members suffer injury
through the loss of companionship and familial ties. Secondly, "the injury is
fairly traceable" to the discriminatory nature of the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot Pol-
icy. Lastly, if it is ruled that the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot Policy is unconstitu-
tional, Haitian refugees will be able to seek asylum in the same manner as
Cuban refugees, which will allow the family members companionship and
familial ties.
Nonetheless, such an argument for standing will be difficult to maintain
because the Eleventh Circuit has recognized three circumstances for rejecting
a party's assertion for prudential reasons, the second determination that must
be made in order to establish standing: '(1) assertion of a third party's [puta-
tive] rights rather than individual legal rights; (2) allegation of a generalized
grievance rather than an injury peculiar to such litigant; or (3) assertion of an
injury outside the statute's or constitutional provision's zone of interests."' 197
A substantial argument can be made that the family members would be
asserting an injury that is beyond the scope of the statute's interest, since the
purpose in instituting the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot Policy was to deter to illegal
departures and casualties caused by such departures, and not to provide com-
panionship and familial ties.' 98 Companionship and familial ties are inciden-
tal happenings that result or do not result from the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot Pol-
icy.
Even so, should a court decide that a family member has standing to
bring such a cause of action that the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot Policy discriminates
against Haitians, the court must analyze the constitutionality of the policy.
As mentioned above, Congress need only have a rational basis when formu-
lating and adopting regulations concerning aliens, even if such regulations
discriminate among different classes of aliens.' 99 In analyzing the policy
through a rational basis scrutiny standpoint, the court must determine
whether "there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment
and some legitimate governmental purpose." 200 As previously stated, Con-
gress has the power to "control the effects of immigration" and "where [it]
makes a judgment that immigration is creating, or adding to, financial bur-
196. Landon, 459 U.S. at 32.
197. Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n, Inc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1423 (1 1th Cir. 1995)
(quoting F.D.I.C. v. Morley, 867 F.2d 1381, 1386 (1 1th Cir. 1989)).
198. Estevez, supra note 10, at 1290.
199. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v.
United States, 169 F.3d 1342 (11 th Cir. 1989); Moore v. Ashcrofi, 251 F.3d 919 (11th Cir.
2001).
200. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993).
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dens, it lies within Congress' plenary sovereign power over immigration to
take action to alleviate such burdens. ' 0 '
As such, it can be easily argued that Congress has instituted such a pol-
icy to deter mass amounts of immigration. In allowing Cubans a chance at
asylum, it has made such a decision because of the political state of the coun-
try.22 On the other hand, Haiti is a democratic country.20 3 Although it is a
poor country with many problems, theoretically and politically it is a democ-
ratic country.2" Clearly, this is a reason that is rationally related to a legiti-
mate governmental purpose.20 5 Since the legislature has plenary power over
immigration, it is difficult to challenge such a policy.
26
However, a Haitian emigrant who arrives to the United States through
the seas and touches land should be afforded some constitutional protection.
This is truly where the discrimination comes in with the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot
Policy. Haitians who arrive in Florida and touch land are sent to Guan-
tanamo Bay pending an asylum hearing.20 7 In contrast, Cubans who arrive in
the same exact manner, and of course, touch land are given the adjusted
status of permanent residency. 28 Given these sets of circumstances, Haitian
immigrants should be afforded some constitutional rights to bring a claim
that the policy discriminates against Haitians. Theoretically, illegal aliens
have been afforded some rights in the past; however, "illegal aliens are as-
sumably removable at any time. '2 °9
It has not been said that Haitian emigrants who touch land are consid-
ered illegal aliens, rather that they are detainees, since they are detained
pending an asylum hearing.210 However, should they be considered illegal
aliens for purposes of challenging the constitutionality of the policy, they
clearly would have met the factors required to establish standing for such a
cause of action.21 Such a Haitian emigrant would have suffered an actual
injury of being sent back to Haiti and the obvious lack of permanent resi-
dency as Cubans are afforded. Further, the injury is a result of the policy
issued by Congress, and should the Haitian emigrant(s) receive a favorable
verdict, the injury would likely be redressed. Additionally, none of the three
201. Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1351.
202. See Estevez, supra note 10, at 1292.
203. See id. at 1293.
204. See id.
205. Heller, 509 U.S. at 319-20.
206. Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1351.
207. See East & Monnay, supra note 152.
208. Estevez, supra note 10, at 1277.
209. Moore, 251 F.3d at 925.
210. East & Monnay, supra note 152.
211. Harrisv. Evans, 20F.3d 1118, 1121 (llth Cir. 1994).
[Vol. 28:2:437
28
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 16
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss2/16
WET FOOT, DRY FOOT, NO FOOT
circumstances for rejecting a party's assertion for prudential reasons would
apply in this situation.212 As such, the Haitian emigrant(s) in this case would
clearly have standing should they be afforded some constitutional protec-
tion.213 However, there still remains one more hurdle: rational basis scru-
tiny. 214 This is one hurdle that would be difficult to overcome, since the
same argument can be made that Cuba is a communist country, while Haiti is
"democratic." Thus, it seems that even if Haitians were given the opportu-
nity to challenge the Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot Policy, there is a slim chance that
they would prevail because the legislature simply has to argue that the policy
is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.2 5
VII. CONCLUSION
The Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot Policy has generated a tremendous amount of
controversy. Here we have two freedom-loving nations, Haiti and Cuba,
which have been subjected to the most dire political and economic conditions
known to man.216 Their leaders have taken two different roads: one to a
"democracy," and the other attempting to perpetuate the remnants of a rap-
idly vanishing political system, "communism., 2 7 The people of Haiti and
Cuba, however, look out in the horizon and only see one thing: a beacon of
light emanating from the land of opportunity. That shining ray of light spells
freedom in two languages: LIBERTAD and LIBERTE! They are not con-
cerned with whether they reach the American shores with wet or dry feet.
They are concerned with that elusive concept which we Americans cherish
the most: a free and democratic society. Thus, it is all in the hands of the
politicians. 2 8 Although, legally Haitians have a nominal chance of achieving
treatment equal to that of Cubans, the Legislature has the power to change
this. 2 9 The consensus seems to be that [I]t is imperative to fight for the leg-
islative equivalent to the [Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot Policy] for Haitians and not
equality through the retraction of it.22°
212. F.D.I.C. v. Morley, 867 F.2d 1381, 1386 (1 th Cir. 1989).
213. Harris, 20F.3dat 1121.
214. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); see also Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. United
States, 169 F.3d 1342 (11 th Cir. 1999); Moore v. Ashcroft, 251 F.3d 919 (11 th Cir. 2001).
215. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993).
216. See generally CIA I, supra note 1; CIA II, supra note 1.
217. Id.
218. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 319-20.
219. Id.
220. Estevez, supra note 10, at 1294.
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